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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
A. A. EASTON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 8349 
MILTON S. WYCOFF, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This case involves a claim for $17,700 damages, which 
plaintiff and appellant alleges were caused to him by the 
failure of defendant and respondent to make a ten-year 
lease covering certain real property in accordance with an 
alleged oral agreement. Plaintiff and appellant has ap-
pealed from an adverse judgment of the District Court 
which granted defendant's motions to dismiss and for sum-
mary judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For convenience, this brief will use the trial court's 
designations of the parties hereto, and refers to the appel-
lant, Easton, as "plaintiff"; and to the respondent, Wycoff, 
as "defendant." All references to the official record on ap-
peal are indicated hereafter by a capital R which precedes 
the page number of the record; for instance, page 5 of the 
record will be indicated as "R-5." 
The facts, for the purpose of this appeal, consist of 
the amended complaint ( quoted in plaintiff's brief) and a 
stipulation made in open court that no written memorandum 
of the alleged oral agreement ever existed or is claimed to 
exist ( R-24). 
Inasmuch as plaintiff has stated the background of this 
litigation, in addition to setting forth the allegations of the 
amended complaint, it will be appropriate to detail the 
matters discussed by plaintiff with the understanding that 
the allegations of the amended complaint, and no inter-
pretation or summarization thereof, are the allegations upon 
which the District Court granted defendant's motions and 
entered summary judgment in defendant's favor. 
This is the third case which has arisen from the same 
transaction, wherein Wycoff sought to purchase the real 
property located at 1554 South 2nd West, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, in August, 1951. (See page 2, Brief of Appellant, on 
file herein.) Wycoff, as plaintiff therein, prevailed in the 
first law suit, brought in December, 1951, against the real 
estate company and the owner of this property, to rescind 
his offer to purchase said real estate herein involved, caused 
by the seller's breach of the sales contract, and to recover 
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his earnest money. (See Wycoff vs. Bettilyon's, Inc. and 
Friedman, Civil No. 94,108, in the District Court for Salt 
Lake County. No appeal was taken from this decision.) 
Thereafter, in the second case, one Robert P. Woolley, a 
real estate broker, sought and recovered a commission from 
Wycoff for securing plaintiff, A. A. Easton, as a tenant for 
part of the same premises. (See Woolley vs. W ycofJ, 2 
Utah 2d. 329, 273, P. 2d. 181; Henriod concurring, Wade 
and Larson, D. J., dissenting.) 
According to the allegations of the amended complaint, 
plaintiff and defendant had conversations on three differ-
ent dates: on August 9, 1951 ( R-11, par. 1 ), August 16, 
1951 (R-12, par. 3), and August 20, 1951 (R-12, pars. 4, 
5, and 6). Plaintiff alleges that an oral lease agreement 
was effected during these discussions. Thereafter, the 
amended complaint alleges that on August 22, 1951, "the 
defendant formulated a conviction that he would not ac-
quire the said premises and that title could not be cleared." 
(R-14, par. 8.) 
Some jurisdictional question may be involved in tpjs 
case, although defendant does no more than to call it to 
the Court's attention. Plaintiff did not file his notice of 
appeal until April 7, 1955 (R-26), although the trial court, 
which had previously granted two motions to dismiss the 
complaint ( R-9) and the amended complaint ( R-20), 
when it subsequently granted defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, ordered that the time for appeal was to 
run from March 2, 1955 ( R-23). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The doctrine of estoppel has no operation here be-
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cause the misrepresentations alleged involve only im-
material facts and a promise as to future conduct 
which expressed no intent to abandon an existing 
right. 
II. Plaintiffs claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds be-
cause said claim sounds in contract and essential ele-
ments of an action for fraud and deceit are lacking. 
III. No enforceable agreement was ever made. The parties 
never reached a final agreement, and missing essential 
elements of the alleged lease cannot be supplied by 
parol. 
POINT I. 
The doctrine of estoppel has no operation here because 
the misrepresentations alleged involve only immaterial facts 
and a promise as to future conduct which expressed no 
intent to abandon an existing right. 
The question to be determined by the Court is whether 
this is one of those rare cases where an oral promise clearly 
within the Statute of Frauds can be removed from the clear 
mandate of the Statute, which reads as follows: 
U.C.A. 1953: 
Sec. 25-5-1. "No estate or interest in real prop-
erty, other than leases for a term not exceeding one 
year ... shall be created ... otherwise than by a~t 
or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance m 
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writing subscribed by the party creating . . . the 
same .... " 
Sec. 25-5-3. "Every contract for the leasing for 
a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of 
any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void 
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his law-
ful agent thereunto authorized in writing." 
Sec. 25-5-4. "In the following cases every agree-
ment shall be void unless such agreement, or some 
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing sub-
scribed by the party to be charged therewith: 
" ( 1) Every agreement that by its terms is not 
to be performed within one year from the making 
thereof." 
Clearly, the requirements of the Statute have not been ob-
served under the facts of this case, and any alleged oral 
lease for ten years is void. But plaintiff urges that the Dis-
trict Court was in error, and that defendant is estopped 
to plead the Statute due to certain alleged misrepresenta-
tions which he urges created an estoppel, preventing the 
application of the clear language of the Statute. The al-
leged misrepresentations, relied upon for this purpose by 
plaintiff, are summarized at page 19 of appellant's brief, 
as follows: 
"This situation was created by the misrepresenta-
tions of the defendant, ( 1) that he owned the prop-
erty, ( 2) that the plaintiff should take possession 
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thereof, and ( 3) that a written lease would follow." 
(Numbering added.) 
It would seem only fair to point out that, although the 
writer of the brief above-quoted states that defendant repre-
sented that plaintiff should take possession of the premises, 
the language of the amended complaint only goes so far 
as to state that defendant represented he could move into 
the leased premises (see R-13, paragraphs 5 and 6). The 
difference is obvious. 
A representation that a person is the owner in posses-
sion of real property contains no presumption in fact or in 
law that the representer will execute a contract to lease 
said property. Any representation that plaintiff could take 
possession of the premises at a future date, and that a writ-
ten lease would be prepared by the defendant's attorney, 
is an indication that there were matters yet to be agreed 
upon. The alleged misrepresentation as to ownership and 
possession are not material here 
The Utah Supreme Court has never departed from the 
following rule, established in Elliot v. Whitmore, 23 Utah 
342, 65 P. 70, as set forth in the syllabus of the Court: 
"An estoppel will not arise simply from a breach of 
promise as to future conduct, or from a mere disap-
pointment of expectations. The only case in which 
a representation as to the future can be held to 
operate as an estoppel is where it relates to an in-
tended abandonment of an existing right." 
This doctrine was cited with approval in Ravarino v. Price, 
260 P. 2d 570, which plaintiff attempts to distinguish from 
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the instant case. There are certain distinctions to be noted, 
but all of them make the Ravarino case more favorable to 
defendant. Unlike the instant claim for money damages, 
the Ravarino case contained two counts: one in equity for 
specific performance of an alleged oral contract to convey 
land, and one for money damages. The doctrines of part 
performance and estoppel are stated "to be indistinguish-
able." (See footnote 1, Ravarino case, 260 P. 2d at 57 4.) 
The Court also makes short shrift of the count for money 
damages (see last page of the opinion) after discussing at 
length and rejecting the equitable arguments of estoppel 
in the first count for specific performance, in the following 
language: 
"The second count in the complaint is an action at 
law for money damages; however plaintiff cannot 
obtain relief on that basis. It is well settled in this 
jurisdiction that the doctrine of part performance is 
not available in an action for damages on an oral 
contract to convey land. (Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 
1, 184 P. 2d 335. )" 
Also in the Ravarino case, with which the Court is more 
familiar than this writer, Justice Wolfe assembled and ana-
lyzed most of the authorities involving the doctrine of 
estoppel to preclude the effect of the Statute of Frauds, and 
it is only with the thought of making the conclusion of this 
opinion readily accessible that the same is quoted, as fol-
lows, from 260 P 2d at 578: 
"The authorities are against the proposition that 
nonperformance of a promise is fraud which will 
establish an estoppel in bais. Under the facts al-
leged the plaintiff could not make a case of equit-
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able estoppel under these principles of law,· since 
the oral representations of Mr. Price that he would 
GOmplete the negotiations constituted nothing more 
than a promise a~' to future conduct, not a repre-
sent8tion as to· a material and existing fact nor the 
expression of an intent to aba1idon an existing right. 
Further, we have examined the cases relied on by 
plaintiff, and think that the doctrine they announce 
is eitl1er consistent with the foregoing· principles of 
equitable estoppel or where the facts show posses-
sion of the premises and improvement of the land 
by the party claiming the fraud, which brings us to 
a consideration of the doctrine of part performance, 
as before stated a species of estoppel:" 
The editors of 19 American Jurisprudence 656, Sec. 
52, state the following general principles: 
"The general rule is well settled that in order to 
furnish the basis of an estoppel, a representation or 
assurance must relate to some present or past fact 
or state of things, as distinguished from mere prom-
ises or expressions of opinion as to the future. A 
truthful statement as to the present intention of a 
party with regard to his future act is not the founda-
tion upon which an estoppel may be built. A per-
son cannot be bound, by any rule of morality or 
good faith, not to change his intention, nor can he 
be precluded from showing such change merely be-
cause he has previously represented that his inten-
tions were once different from those which he even-
tually executed. The reason on which the doctrine 
of estoppel rests wholly fails when the representa-
tion relates only to a present intention or purpose 
of a party, because, its nature ·being uncertain and 
liable to change, it could not properly form a basis 
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or inducement upon which a party could reasonabl;, 
adopt any fixed and permanent course of action." 
Nowhere in the amen~ed complaint does plaintiff al-
lege that defendant had an existing right to lease the prem-
ises. Plaintiff merely alleges that defendant represent~ d 
that defendant was the owner and in possession of the prem-
ises ( R-12 to 13, paragraphs 4, 5, and 6), or that plaintiff 
believed defendant was entitled to lease the premises ( R-15, 
paragraph 9. In addition, according to the amended com-
plaint, all of said representations as to ownership were 
made between August 9, 1951, and August 20, 1951, which 
period was prior to the time defendant decided not to 
purchase the premises on August 22, 1951 ( R-14, paragraph 
8); therefore, defendant had no present intention not to 
perform his alleged oral promises made before August 22, 
1951. 
The authorities which plaintiff relies on are discussed 
in Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. 2, Sec. 533A, at 
footnote 4, which classifies Interstate Bry-Block Mere. Co., 
30 Fed. 2d 172; Seytnour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88; 
and Tchula Com. Co. v. Jackson, 147 Miss. 296, 111 So. 
87 4; as cases where the doctrine of promissory estoppel has 
been "extended to permit recovery on the contract by one 
who has relied, to his detriment, on the promise of the 
defendant to execute and deliver a sufficient memorandum." 
Obviously, the case at bar does not involve a promise to 
deliver a sufficient memorandum, because the only memo-
randum referred to by plaintiff is the lease which defend-
ant's attorney was to prepare and submit to plaintiff ( R-12, 
paragraph 3). The draft of the lease to be prepared by 
defendant's attorney and, as alleged by plaintiff, to be sub-
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mitted directly to the plaintiH ( R-12, paragraph 3 ), al-
though an unusual procedure, at least clearly establishes 
that defendant had no opportunity to subscribe his name 
thereto to constitute a sufficient memorandum, as required 
by the Statute of Frauds. 
The next sentence in the same section, of Williston on 
Contracts, supra, reads as follows: 
"A mere refusal to perform an oral agreement within 
the Statute (of Frauds), however, is not such fraud 
as will justify a court in disregarding the Statute 
even though it result in hardship to the plaintiff." 
(These three cases relied upon by plaintiff were also dis-
cussed and distinguished in the Ravarino case at 260 P. 2d 
570, at p. 575. ) 
The doctrine of estoppel to assert the Statute of Frauds 
has no application here. 
POINT II. 
Plaintiff's claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds be-
cause said claim sounds in contract and essential elements 
of an action for fraud and deceit are lacking. 
The following general principles are set forth at 49 
American Jurisprudence 887, sec. 580: 
" ... it is clear that the mere breach or viola-
tion of an oral agreement which is within the 
statute of frauds, by one of the parties thereto, or his 
mere denial of an agreement or refusal to perform 
it, is not of itself a fraud either in equity or at law 
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from which the courts will give relief or which will 
enable the other party to assert rights and defenses 
based on the contract. If it were, the statute of 
frauds would be rendered vain and nugatory. The 
mere nonperformance of an oral contract, within the 
statute which is pleaded, where no relation of trust 
and confidence exists, does not constitute fraud 
authorizing the interposition of a court of equity. 
And the mere fact that the party to be charged ex-
pressly agreed that he would reduce the oral con-
tract to writing is not sufficient to authorize a court 
of equity to interpose. The statute of frauds cannot 
be disregarded for the prevention of mere wrong or 
to remedy possible losses. Wherever there is an 
oral contract on which a party has relied, it is, in 
some degree, a wrong and hardship upon him to 
hold it invalid; the enforcement of the statute must 
always be, in a sense (although, of course, not in 
legal contemplation), a fraud or wrong upon him 
against whom it is enforced." 
Plaintiff cannot escape application of the Statute of 
Frauds by alleging his action sounds in tort and not in 
contract, because the basis of plaintiff's claim is for the 
alleged breach of a contract, and not a tort action for fraud 
and deceit. This was settled in the case of Papanikolas v. 
Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 274 P. 856, an action for damages 
caused by the alleged false promises and misrepresentations 
of the defendant, including a promise, alleged to be false, 
that, if plaintiff would not defend a real estate mortgage 
foreclosure action, defendant would resell said real estate 
to plaintiff for $20,000, although the premises were reason-
ably worth $56,000. Plaintiff contended that he acted in 
reliance upon said false representation, to his damage, but 
the Court held that the gravamen of plaintiffs action was 
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12 
for the breach of an oral contract within the Statute of 
Frauds, as follows: 
"The controlling question in our opinion is, Is tllis 
an action at law to recover damages for fraud and 
deceit as contended by appellants, or is it an action 
for breach of contract for the sale of land as con-
tended by respondents? If the former, the statute 
of frauds does not apply. If the latter, the statute 
applies and the action cannot be maintained. The 
sections of the statute pleaded by defendants (sec-
tions 4874, 5811, and 5813, Comp. ~aws Utah 1917) 
provide in substance that contracts for the sale of 
land are void unless in writing. What is the grava-
men of plaintiffs' cause of action? What is the relief 
sought and what are the grounds for such relief? 
These are pertinent questions here .... 
"It is undisputed that the contract alleged in 
the complaint was an oral contract for the sale of 
real estate, and while it is ·contended by plaintiffs 
that they are not suing for damages for a breach of 
the contract, but for damages for fraud and deceit, 
they, nevertheless, pray for a sum equal in amount 
to the difference in the actual value of the property 
as alleged by them and the amount they were to 
pay for it under the alleged promises and representa-
tions made by defendants. The amount of damages 
claimed exactly coinciding with the measure of dam-
ages for a breach of contract, together with the 
other elements above mentioned, are persuasive in 
a high degree that this is an action for a breach of 
contract and not an action for fraud and deceit. It 
is true that plaintiffs allege that the promises and 
representations made by defendants were fraudulent 
and made with intent to deceive and mislead plain-
tiffs and lull them into a sense of security in order 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
that defendants might obtain title to the property 
in question and deprive plantiffs thereof; but such 
alle~ations are not even evidence, much less proof 
of the fact. Whether the gravamen of plaintiffs' 
cause of action is damages for breach of contract or 
Jam:J.:rc"; for fraud must be determined by the law 
applicable to the facts of the case. 
"It follows from the foregoing discussion that the 
court is of opinion that this is an action for a breach 
of contract for the sale of real estate, and, the con-
tract being verbal, it is barred by the statute of 
frauds." 
The Court, in the Ravarino case, supra, also quotes 
from the Papanikolas case, at 260 P. 2d 578, as follows: 
"Nor, as a g-eneral rule, can fraud be predicated 
upon the failure to perform a promise or contract 
which is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, 
since in such case the promissor has not, in a legal 
sense, made a contract, and hence has the right, 
both in law and in equity, to refuse to perform." 
The Papanikolas case, 274 P. 856, at p. 861, also makes clear 
that a fraudulent intent must have existed when the alleged 
false promises and misrepresentations were made: 
"Unless a fraudulent intention existed when the al-
leged promises and representations were made, they 
would not constitute fraud for which an action at 
law for deceit could be maintained." 
The requisite intent is lacking here, as was pointed out in 
detail under Point I of this brief. 
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The same rule has been followed in Nielson v. Leam-
ington Mines & Exploration Corporation, 87 Utah 69, 48 
P. 2d 439, an action to set aside a deed to certain mining 
claims. The Supreme Court reversed the lower Court for 
its refusal to grant defendant's motion for nonsuit, and 
stated: 
"To predicate a cause of action in fraud upon a fail-
ure to perform a promise, there must be an intention 
on the part of the promisor at the time of making 
the promise not to perform it. 
" 'If the promise is made in good faith when the 
contract is entered into there is no fraud, though the 
promisor subsequently changes his mind and fails 
or refuses to perform.' 12 R. C. L. 262; Hull v. 
Flinders, 83 Utah, 158, 27 P. ( 2d) 56. Nonperform-
ance of the promise alone is not evidence of fraud. 
12 R. C. L. 255." 
Plaintiff's amended complaint does not state that de-
fendant made his alleged promise to lease the premises 
with the intent not to perform it. Rule 9(b ), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, requires that fraud be pleaded with 
particularity. Such facts have not been alleged here, in 
neither the complaint nor the amended complaint. 
Cases on this particular problem have been selected 
and analyzed in a series of annotations entitled, "Promises 
and Statements as to Future Events as Fraud." (51 ALR 
46, as supplemented in 68 ALR 635, 91 ALR 1296, and 
125 ALR 879. ) The general rule is stated at 51 ALR 49, 
as follows: 
"The general rule, which is supported by numer-
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ous decisions in almost all jurisdictions, is that fraud 
must relate to a present or pre-existing fact, and 
cannot ordinarily be predicated on unfulfilled prom-
ises or statements as to future events. There are 
various reasons for this general rule, applicable ac-
cording to the particular circumstances. The usual 
grounds assigned are that such representations and 
promises should be regarded merely as statements 
of opinion, hopes, or expectations, on which the 
party to whom they are made has no legal right to 
rely, and that a statement as to a future event can-
not, i~ the very nature of the case, be false when 
made. 
The principal exception to the general rule is that fraud 
may be predicated on promises clearly made without an 
intention of performance. Utah has recognized this ex-
ception (Zion's Co-op Home Building and Real Estate Com-
pany, 46 Utah 1, 148 P. 401; and Hull v. Flinders, 83 Utah 
158, 27 P. 2d .56), although a minority view holds that 
fraud cannot be predicated on any promise to do a thing 
in the future, regardless of intent. (See Division II in the 
annotations just described.) It is submitted that the gen-
eral n1le would apply here. 
A few of the many cases from other jurisdictions which, 
as in this case, involve only a refusal to perform an oral 
promise which is void under the Statute of Frauds, and 
where it has been held that an action for fraud could not 
be maintained, are as follows: Davidson v. Edwards, 168 
Ark. 306, 270 SW 94; Little v. Union Oil, 73 Cal. App. 612, 
238 P. 1066; Hazleton v. Lewis, 267 Mass. 533, 166 NE 876; 
Moore v. DeBernardi, 47 Nev. 33, 213 P. 1041, (reh. den., 
47 Nev. 46, 220 P. 544); Lovett v. Taylor, 54 NJ Eq. 311, 
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34 A. 896; Levy v. Brush, 45 NY 589; Wheeler v. Reynolds, 
66 NY 227. 
POINT III. 
No enforceable agreement was ever made. The parties 
never reached a final agreement, and missing essential ele-
ments of the alleged lease cannot be supplied by parol. 
Although plaintiff believes the foregoing arguments, 
under Points I and II herein, have fully answered the points 
raised by plaintiff in his appeal, another reason yet remains 
why the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. 
It is because plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, through failure and inability to show 
in the amended complaint that a valid and enforceable con-
tract exists. As stated in a case very factually similar to 
the case at bar, Rosenfield v. United States Trust Company, 
200 Mass. 210, 195, NE 323: 
"Normally, the fact that parties contemplate the 
execution of a final written agreement effects a 
strong inference that the parties do not intend to 
be bound by earlier negotiations or agreements until 
the final terms are settled." 
Under facts more favorable to plaintiff than in the instant 
case, because a letter existed, subscribed by the defendant 
oil company, the Utah Supreme Court, in Birdzell v. Utah 
Oil Refining Company, ........ Utah ........ , 242 P. 2d 578, at 
page 580, stated as follows: 
"The above letter will not suffice as an adequate 
memorandum because it lacks an acknowledgment 
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or recognition that a contract has been entered into 
by the parties. See Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 2, 
Sees. 503, 511; Ebling Brewing Co. v. Cereal Prod-
ucts Co., 2 Cir., 6 F. 2d 984; Franklin Sugar Refining 
Co. v. John, 279 Pa. 104, 123 A. 685; Upton Mill & 
Elevator Co. v. Baldwin Flour Mills, 147 Minn. 205, 
179 N.W. 904. Such acknowledgment or recogni-
tion need not be shown by memorandum in cases 
where a written and signed offer is relied upon as 
a memorandum because the acceptance may be 
proved by oral testimony. But in the instant case 
the appellant does not contend that he made an oral 
acceptance to an offer made in writing and signed 
by the respondent. He claims to have made an 
oral acceptance to an oral offer made by the re-
spondent, and that the letter appearing above is a 
memorandum of that contract having been written 
after the alleged contract had been entered into. 
Under his contention, the appellant must fail since 
there is nothing in the letter which expressly or im-
pliedly lends authenticity to the existence of the 
alleged oral agreement theretofore made by the 
parties .... 
"However, even if the letter did contain an ad-
mission, acknowledgment, or recognition of the al-
leged prior oral agreement, there is another reason 
why it will not suffice as a memorandum. It is 
fundamental that the memorandum which is relied 
upon to satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all 
the essential terms and provisions of the contract. 
Collett v. Goodrich, Utah, 231, P. 2d 730; Hawaiian 
Equipment Co. v. Eimco Corp., Utah, 207 P. 2d 
794." 
To mention only one of the essential elements that is missing 
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in the alleged oral lease, it does not specify the time and 
manner of payment of the rental alleged. 
The Utah Supreme Court granted defendant's motion 
for summary judgment in the Birdzell case, even though 
the defendant had written a letter which plaintiff therein 
contended was a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds. No such memorandum exists in the case 
at bar, nor does it involve a written offer to lease which 
may be accepted orally, as pointed out above. The case 
at bar involves, at best, only an alleged oral offer which 
plaintiff attempts to accept orally, which our law does not 
permit against the defense of the Statute of Frauds. No 
definite agreement was ever reached, and could not be 
reached until the proposed lease was reduced to writing, 
as contemplated by the parties. 
Plaintiff's claim must also fail because he can neither 
plead nor prove the existence of the alleged lease and its 
essential elements. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court committed no error in granting de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, because plaintiff's 
claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds and does not state 
a clain1 upon which relief can be granted. 
WHEREFORE, M. S. Wycoff, defendant and respond-
ent, prays that the judgment of the lower court be affirmed 
with costs to respondent. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
WAYNE C. DURHAM, 
Attorney for defendant 
and respondent. 
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